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Deceptively Simple: 
the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act 
INTRODUCTION 
In the 2017 legislative session, the Arkansas General 
Assembly significantly changed the Arkansas Deceptive Trade 
Practices Act (“ADTPA”).1  These changes now prohibit private 
class actions under the ADTPA and require plaintiffs to prove 
additional elements of reliance and actual financial loss when 
bringing a claim.2  The changes appear to limit the ability of a 
consumer to bring a private action under the ADPTA.3  With 
these changes, Arkansas joins a minority of jurisdictions with 
deceptive trade practices acts that increase a plaintiff’s burden 
and restrict private class actions.4 
Part I of this paper examines the history and purpose 
behind consumer protection statutes.  Specifically, it will discuss 
how the federal consumer protection movement encouraged 
states to create their own consumer protection statutes.  Part I 
also provides a history of the consumer protection act in 
Arkansas and the purposes behind the changes made in 2017. 
Part II compares the changes to the ADTPA with 
jurisdictions that have the same elemental requirements.  By 
looking to other states, Arkansas plaintiffs, defendants, and 
     The author thanks Sara Gosman, Associate Professor of Law, University of Arkansas 
School of Law, for her constant support during the writing process, Howard Brill, Vincent 
Foster Professor of Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility, University of Arkansas 
School of Law, for his guidance and input, Mr. Kevin Crass, Friday, Eldredge & Clark, for 
his invaluable information, Forrest Stobaugh, for his dedication as a Note and Comment 
Editor, and the author’s family for their unwavering dedication and encouragement. 
1. H.B. 1742, 91st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2017); see also Megan
Hargraves, Changes To Deceptive Trade Practices Act Will Make Arkansas More 
Business-Friendly, TALK BUS. & POL. (May 7, 2017, 8:32 PM) 
https://talkbusiness.net/2017/05/changes-to-deceptive-trade-practices-act-will-make-
arkansas-more-business-friendly/ [https://perma.cc/4C4T-T5PD]. 
2. H.B. 1742, 91st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2017) 
3. See Hargraves, supra note 1.
4. See DEE PRIDGEN & RICHARD M. ALDERMAN, CONSUMER PROTECTION AND THE
LAW § 6.4 (2017). 
1032 ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol.  71:4 
courts can see how these requirements have been judicially 
interpreted and practiced. 
Finally, Part III examines a consumer’s ability to bring a 
class action in a federal court under diversity jurisdiction.  Also, 
Part III analyzes the possibility the class action prohibition will 
be ruled a violation of the separation-of-powers doctrine in 
Arkansas due to the Arkansas Supreme Court’s rulemaking 
authority in Constitutional Amendment 80. 
I. BACKGROUND
At common law consumers had limited remedies, such as 
fraud and misrepresentation claims, for what are now called 
unfair and deceptive trade practices.5  These remedies required 
plaintiffs to prove elements of justifiable reliance and intent, 
which was difficult.6  With the creation of the Federal Trade 
Commission, Congress created an enforcement agency and 
outlawed deceptive trade practices.7  Arkansas, and every other 
state, soon followed Congress’ lead and created state consumer 
protection acts to provide consumers with protection from 
deceptive trade practices.8 
A. FEDERAL CONSUMER PROTECTION
In 1914, Congress passed the Federal Trade Commission 
Act (“FTC Act”) and created the Federal Trade Commission 
(“FTC”) to regulate “false advertising and deceitful commercial 
schemes.”9  The FTC was originally concerned with antitrust 
and trade violations.10  Congress later passed the Wheeler-Lea 
Act of 1938 which made unfair or deceptive acts unlawful and 
gave the FTC power to “prohibit unfair or deceptive acts.”11  
Under the FTC Act, the Commission may only pursue action if 
5. Victor E. Schwartz & Cary Silverman, Common-Sense Construction of Consumer
Protection Acts, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 6-7 (2005). 
6. Id. 
7. Id. 
8. Dee Pridgen, Wrecking Ball Disguised as Law Reform: ALEC’s Model Act on 
Private Enforcement of Consumer Protection Statutes, 39 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 
279, 283 (2015). 
9. Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 5, at 7.
10. Id. at 8.
11. Id. 
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it is in the “public interest and affects interstate commerce.”12  
Although remedies for violations are typically injunctive forms 
of relief, the FTC may seek some types of equitable relief such 
as freezing assets.13 
A private right of action is not available under the FTC Act, 
only the Commission has the right to enforce deceptive trade 
violations.14  According to the legislative history of the FTC 
Act, Congress wanted an agency to “educate businesses, seek 
voluntary compliance, and issue prospective remedies . . . .”15  
Also, a concern existed that a private action under the FTC Act 
would result in state court judges not being “constrained by the 
overall enforcement goals of the FTC . . . .”16 
B. STATES ADOPT DECEPTIVE TRADE
PRACTICES ACTS 
Following Congress’ enactment of the FTC, state 
legislatures began creating state deceptive trade practices acts.17  
These state statutes primarily emulated the FTC Act, however, 
many statutes allow for a private right of action.18  Every state 
now has a deceptive trade practices act and nearly every state 
allows consumers to bring a private right of action.19  A goal of 
these state consumer protection statutes was to provide 
additional enforcement of deceptive trade practice violations 
through private actions.20  The creation of these private right of 
actions was a direct result of Congress’ refusal to promulgate a 
federal private right of action.21 
A second goal of the state deceptive trade statutes was to 
give citizens access to the court system.22  Before the rise of 
consumer protection statutes, the common law remedies were 
12. Pridgen, supra note 8, at 282.
13. Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 5, at 11-12.
14. Id. at 12. 
15. Pridgen, supra note 8, at 282.
16. Id. See also Holloway v. Bristol-Meyers Corp., 485 F.2d 986, 997-98 (D.C. Cir. 
1973). 
17. Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 5, at 15.
18. Id. at 15-16.
19. Id. at 16.
20. Pridgen, supra note 8, at 284
21. Id. at 284-85. 
22. Id. at 285. 
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limited and difficult to prove.23  For example, the common law 
theory of fraud required the consumer plaintiff to prove 
justifiable reliance, which was difficult.24  Other remedies such 
as unconscionability proved to be just as difficult to succeed on 
as fraud.25  The cost of litigation prior to these consumer 
protection statutes also deterred consumers from bringing 
claims.26 
Although state statutes differ on what qualifies as a 
deceptive trade practice, there are some commonalities.  For 
example, many state consumer protection statutes prohibit 
sellers from making false or misleading statements as to the 
quality of goods offered.27  False or misleading representations 
about the benefits of goods offered for sale are also common 
deceptive trade practices.28  In addition, making false or 
misleading statements about the price of goods typically deemed 
in a deceptive trade practice.29 
C. ARKANSAS ADOPTION
In 1971, Arkansas followed the majority of states and 
adopted a consumer protection statute.30  The statute is now 
codified at Ark. Code Ann. § 4-88-113.31  The original statute 
did not provide for a private cause of action and it was not until 
1999 that the Arkansas legislature codified a private right of 
23. Id. 
24. Id.at 286.
25. See Pridgen, supra note 8, at 285-86. 
26. David Benjamin Lee, The Colorado Consumer Protection Act: Panacea or
Pandora’s Box, 70 DENV. U. L. REV. 141, 144 (1992).  
27. Donald M. Zupanec, Practices Forbidden by State Deceptive Trade Practice and
Consumer Protection Acts, 89 A.L.R. 3d 449 (1979) (providing extensive list of deceptive 
trade practices). 
28. Id. at § 12(a). 
29. Id. at § 15.  The Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act provides a list of
general acts considered to be deceptive and unconscionable trade practices which includes 
actions such as “advertising the goods or services with the intent not to sell them as 
advertised” and “knowingly failing to identify flood, water, fire, or accidentally damaged 
goods as to such damages.”  ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-88-107 (a)(1)-(11) (2018).  The 
remainder of the ADTPA provides numerous actions which may be deceptive and 
unconscionable trade practices and ensures unfair trade practices actionable at common law 
are still available under the act.  ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-88-107 to 4-88-109 (2018). 
30. See Hargraves, supra note 1.
31. 1990 Ark. Acts 3662 (codified as amended at ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-88-113).
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action for a deceptive trade practice violation.32  The 1999 
statute provided that “any person who suffers actual damage or 
injury as a result of an offense or violation as defined in this 
chapter has a cause of action to recover actual damages, if 
appropriate, and reasonable attorney’s fees.”33 
Following the creation of the private right of action, several 
individual and class action suits were brought under the 
ADTPA.  Two cases specifically garnered much media attention 
and were discussed by the co-sponsors of the changes to the 
ADTPA.34  The first case began in January 2013 when Vincent 
Gotter filed a complaint against Doctor’s Associates, the 
corporation that franchises Subway, for a violation of the 
ADTPA.35  Gotter purchased a footlong sandwich from Subway 
and discovered the sandwich was shorter than the one-foot 
length advertised.36  The case was soon transferred to the 
Eastern District of Wisconsin and joined with nine other similar 
cases for a class action against Subway.37  The court determined 
the claims were “factually deficient” because the nature of 
baking bread is unpredictable.38  Because of this, class counsel 
re-filed the complaint seeking injunctive instead of 
compensatory relief.39  A settlement was reached outlining 
Subway’s four-year “commitment” including placing warnings 
32. See Hargraves, supra note 1.
33. 1990 Ark. Acts 3662 (codified as amended at ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-88-113(f)).
34. See, e.g., Hearing on H.B. 1742 Before the House, 91st. Gen. Assemb., Reg. 
Sess. (Ark. 2017) (statement of Rep. Michelle Gray) (March 13, 2017) (3:16:21 PM) 
http://www.arkansashouse.org/video-library [https://perma.cc/77DB-QYV]; Hearing on 
H.B. 1742 Before the House, 91st. Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2017) (statement of 
Rep. Laurie Rushing) (March 13, 2017) (3:33:52 PM) 
http://www.arkansashouse.org/video-library [https://perma.cc/77DB-QYV]; John Lynch, 
Lawyers Awarded $1.9M in Expenses in Arkansas Marlboro Case, ARK. DEMOCRAT-
GAZETTE (Jan. 26, 2017, 4:40 AM), http://www.arkansasonline.com/news/2017/jan/ 
26/lawyers-awarded-1-9m-in-expenses-201701/?news-arkansas [https://perma.cc/N7JY-
JKKS]; Robert Loerzel, Food Fight: Subway Sandwich Suit Raises Class Action Questions, 
ABA J. (Feb. 2017), 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/subway_sandwich_class_action 
[https://perma.cc/K5QV-C96Q].  
35. See Class Action Complaint, Gotter v. Doctor’s Assocs., Inc., No. CIV-2013-
240-5 (Ark. Cir. Ct. 2013). 
36. See id.
37. See In re Subway Footlong Sandwich Mktg. and Sales Practices Litg., 869 F.3d 
551, 553 (7th. Cir. 2017). 
38. Id. at 554 
39. Id. at 557.
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stating bread size may vary.40  The parties also agreed to a cap 
of $525,000 for attorney’s fees.41  The district court judge found 
the settlement fair, certified the class, and approved the 
settlement.42  On appeal, the certification was reversed because 
the class members did not benefit from the settlement and the 
attorneys were the only ones to get monetary relief.43 
The second case, Philip Morris v. Miner, was a class action 
involving the ADTPA and was argued before the Arkansas 
Supreme Court in 2015.44  In Philip Morris, the Arkansas 
Supreme Court upheld a class certification for customers who 
bought cigarettes from Philip Morris Companies.45  Plaintiffs 
argued defendants falsely advertised their cigarettes as being 
“healthier and contained less tar and nicotine than regular 
cigarettes”46  Defendants argued that the court should not certify 
the class because the prerequisites of predominance and 
superiority were not met.47  Specifically Philip Morris argued 
that these prerequisites could not be met because the ADTPA 
required plaintiffs to prove reliance on the false advertising.48  
However, the Supreme Court found that reliance was not a 
requirement, and even if it was a requirement, “individual class 
plaintiff[’]s reliance on a defendant’s misrepresentation does not 
destroy predominance.”49  Because the court found 
predominance and superiority, the class certification was 
upheld.50  In her dissent, Justice Hart pointed to the “actual 
damage” requirement of the ADTPA as a reason the class should 
not have been certified.51  Justice Hart accepted Philip Morris’ 
argument that injury can only be shown under the statute if 
“purchasers did not receive less tar and nicotine and they would 
have spent less money on cigarettes in the absence of the alleged 
40. Id. at 553 
41. Id. at 557.
42. In re Subway Footlong Sandwich Mktg. and Sales Practices Litg., 869 F.3d at 
557. 
43. Id. 
44. See Philip Morris Co., Inc. v. Miner, 2015 Ark. 73, 462 S.W.3d 313.
45. See id.
46. Id. at 1, 462 S.W.3d at 315.
47. Id. at 4, 462 S.W.3d at 316.
48. Id. at 9, 462 S.W.3d at 318-19. 
49. Phillip Morris Co., Inc., 2015 Ark. 73, at 10, 462 S.W.3d at 319.
50. Id. at 1, 462 S.W.3d 313.
51. Id. at 3, 462 S.W.3d at 316.
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misrepresentation.”52  Plaintiffs eventually settled with Philip 
Morris in a $45 million settlement agreement.53 
D. 2017 CHANGES TO ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-88-113
(ADTPA) 
In the 2017 legislative session, the Arkansas Legislature 
amended the ADTPA in three significant ways.54  The first 
major change to the ADTPA is the new requirement that a 
plaintiff must rely on the deceptive trade practice.55  The second 
is that a plaintiff must have an actual financial loss in order to 
bring a claim under ADTPA.56  The amendment defines actual 
financial loss as “an ascertainable amount of money that is equal 
to the difference between the amount paid by a person for goods 
or services and the actual market value of the goods or services 
provided to a person.”57  Perhaps the most dramatic change to 
the ADTPA is the third: the amendment prohibited private class 
actions, except those brought for violation of the usury rate 
under Arkansas Constitution Amendment 89.58 
According to the bill’s co-sponsor, Representative Michelle 
Gray, the purpose of the bill was to “limit class actions that can 
be brought under deceptive trade practice.”59  Representative 
Gray pointed to the fact that class actions were easy to certify in 
the state of Arkansas and this amendment was a way to get 
52. Id. at 3, 462 S.W.3d at 324.
53. Suevon Lee, Phillip Morris Strikes $45M Deal In Ark. Marlboro Lights Suit,
Law360 (Sept. 2, 2016, 10:22 PM) https://www.law360.com/articles/836422/philip-morris-
strikes-45m-deal-in-ark-marlboro-lights-suit [https://perma.cc/6UQP-KAZZ].  
54. H.B. 1742, 91st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2017). 
55. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-88-113(f)(1)(A) (2017).
56. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-88-113(f)(1)(A) (2017).
57. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-88-102(9) (2017).
58. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-88-113(f)(1)(B) (2017) (The Attorney General is still
allowed to bring a class action for any deceptive trade violation).  The 2017 amendment 
also added the word “specifically” into ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-88-101(3) (2017).  The effect 
of this addition is to adopt the “specific-conduct rule” which exempts certain conduct that 
is permitted or authorized by state law.  See Nathan Price Chaney, The Arkansas Deceptive 
Trade Practices Act: The Arkansas Supreme Court Should Adopt the Specific-Conduct 
Rule, 67 Ark. L. Rev. 299, 300 (2014) (describing what the specific-conduct rule is and the 
effects of such a rule).  This note focuses only on the changes in ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-88-
113 and § 4-88-103; for guidance on the specific-rule see id. 
59. Supra note 34, at 3:16:21 PM (statement of Rep. Michelle Gray).
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better control on the class actions.60  During Committee and 
House meetings, the general purpose behind the bill appeared to 
be the proliferation of class actions in Arkansas.61  In addition to 
class certification a discussion emerged that, in these class 
actions, trial lawyers were the only people to receive money.62  
Representative Laurie Rushing63, another co-sponsor of the 
amendment, argued that under the old ADTPA “no one here 
wins except the trial lawyers.”64  According to the amendment’s 
supporters, in ADTPA class actions trial lawyers were walking 
away with large amounts of money while consumers were 
simply getting coupons in the mail.65 
At several points during discussions of the amendment, 
members of the House challenged the amendment as a limitation 
on a private consumer’s right to bring a claim under ADTPA.66  
Representative Rushing’s response, in defense of the 
amendment, assured the House that consumers had “other 
venues where they can pursue legal action besides the deceptive 
trade act.”67  In committee, when a speaker explained that 
“deceptive trade practice is usually one of about five legal 
theories . . .” brought with a class action.68  Neither in committee 
nor during the House debates was there significant discussion of 
the new requirements of a plaintiff’s actual financial loss or 
reliance.69  It appeared that the requirement of “actual financial 
loss” was based on the litigation surrounding if a consumer 
suffered actual damage.70  The class action exception for 
violation of Amendment 89 was added after the amendment 
failed to pass due to the worries of payday lenders returning to 
60. Hearing on H.B. 1742 Before the H. Comm. On Ins. & Com., 91st. Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2017) (statement of Rep. Michelle Gray) (March 8, 2017) 
(10:07:00 AM) http://www.arkansashouse.org/video-library [https://perma.cc/77DB-
QYV]. 
61. See id. at 10:07:00 AM (statement of Rep. Michelle Gray).
62. Supra note 34, at 3:33:52 PM (statement of Rep. Laurie Rushing).
63. Representative Laurie Rushing is of no relation to author.
64. Supra note 34, at 3:33:52 PM (statement of Rep. Laurie Rushing).
65. Id. at 3:33:52 PM (statement of Rep. Laurie Rushing).
66. Id. at 3:36:52 PM (statement of Rep. Douglas House).
67. Id. at 3:34:22 PM (statement of Rep. Laurie Rushing).
68. Supra note 60, at 10:07:00 AM (statement of Mr. Kevin Crass).
69. See id. at 10:07:00 AM; supra note 34, at 3:17:25 PM, 3:33:52 PM. 
70. Supra note 60, at 10:09:20 AM (statement of Rep. Michelle Gray).
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Arkansas.71  The amendment eventually passed both the House 
and Senate and went into effect August 1, 2017.72 
The changes to the ADTPA were discussed by supporters 
and opponents of the bill outside the legislature.  According to 
some, the changes to the ADTPA made Arkansas a more 
“business-friendly climate.”73  The previous ADTPA language 
made deceptive trade a “go-to claim in lawsuits against 
companies doing business in Arkansas.”74  With the changes, 
supporters claim, a remedy is still available to those who have 
been harmed but it limits “unnecessary and expensive litigation” 
on behalf of people who have not been harmed.75  
Representative Gray claimed the bill would eliminate “frivolous 
suits that are filed with the intention of forcing a business to 
settle.”76 
However, many opponents saw the changes to the ADTPA 
as harmful to consumers because they eliminated an “effective 
deterrent” against companies who engage in deceptive trade 
practices.77 Because a class action can be a benefit for a group of 
people that have not suffered large financial losses, the 
prohibition would prevent consumers from seeking remedies.78  
Trial attorneys who opposed the amendment argued the “change 
takes the consumer protection out of what was a consumer 
protection statute.”79  According to one opponent, class actions 
are a way to “stop misconduct,” not a way for attorneys to make 
71. Id. at 10:16:45 AM.
72. SUMMARY OF GEN. LEGIS., 91ST GEN. ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF 
ARK., BUREAU OF LEGIS. RES. at 177 (May 
2017), http://www.arkleg.state.ar.us/assembly/2017/2017R/Documents/2017R%20and%20
2017 S1%20Legislative%20General%20Summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/BW5J-LN5R]. 
73. See Hargraves, supra note 1.
74. Id. 
75. Id. 
76. John Lyon, House OKs Bill to Limit Class-Action Suits, BOONEVILLE
DEMOCRAT (March 22, 2017, 11:28 AM), 
http://www.boonevilledemocrat.com/news/20170322/house-oks-bill-to-limit-class-action-
suits [https://perma.cc/45NS-6ETB].  
77. Todd Turner, Deceptive Trade Practices Act Changes Will Harm Arkansas
Consumers, TALK BUS. & POL. (May 7, 2017, 8:32 PM) 
https://talkbusiness.net/2017/05/deceptive-trade-practices-act-changes-will-harm-arkansas-
consumers/ [https://perma.cc/7ZQX-L6YW].   
78. Mark Friedman, Trial Lawyers Cringe at Changes in Deceptive Trade Practices
Act, ARK. BUS. 12-13 (June 12-June 18, 2017). 
79. Id. 
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a large fee, and “[n]obody has to worry about this unless they’re 
engaged in deceptive practices.”80  Members of the Arkansas 
Association of Defense Counsel were also concerned that the 
changes to the ADTPA caused “cringe-worthy outcome[s] for 
defendants” and that the prohibition of class actions would be 
over-turned by the Arkansas Supreme Court based on its 
authority under Amendment 80.81  Although these changes have 
yet to be litigated before an Arkansas court, the debate 
surrounding them demonstrate these changes could have 
dramatic effects on ADTPA litigation. 
II. CHANGES COMPARED TO OTHER STATE
STATUTES 
A. RELIANCE
Under the new requirement of reliance, a consumer must 
now rely on the deceptive trade practice in order to bring a 
claim.82  Requiring reliance in deceptive trade practice claims 
has been a source of significant commentary.83  Some 
commentators believe a reliance requirement goes against the 
purpose of deceptive trade practices acts84, while others see it as 
an effective way to stop the increase in class actions.85  The 
addition of reliance into the ADTPA makes a plaintiff’s claim 
for a deceptive trade practice violation more similar to a fraud 
claim.86  With this similarity, plaintiffs will be faced with the 
question—does the reliance have to be reasonable or justified as 
typically required in fraud claims?  Guidance from other states 
80. Id. 
81. Andrew King, A Deceptive Trade-Off, ARK. ASS’N OF DEF. COUNS. (July 17, 
2017) http://www.arkansasdefensecounsel.net/newsletters/AADC-v3.27-071717.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5GXV-4SDV]. 
82. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-88-113(f) (2017).
83. See, e.g., Shelia B. Scheuerman, The Consumer Fraud Class Action: Reining In
Abuse By Requiring Plaintiffs to Allege Reliance as an Essential Element, 43 HARV. J. ON 
LEGIS. 1 (2006). 
84. See, e.g., Pridgen, supra note 8, 285-87. 
85. See generally Scheuerman, supra note 83.
86. Supra notes 5-28 and accompanying text (discussing fraud as the foundation for
unfair and deceptive trade practices acts). 
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suggests the answer to this question is likely found in the origin 
of reliance in the deceptive trade practice statute.87 
The reliance requirement is added to unfair and deceptive 
trade claims in two ways: (1) through judicial interpretation or; 
(2) by legislative amendment to a statute.88  When reliance is
added through judicial interpretation, the reliance typically must
be reasonable or justified.89 However, when reliance is
statutorily created courts typically do not require the reliance to
be reasonable.90
1. Reliance by Judicial Interpretation
Courts in Georgia and Pennsylvania have both required a 
plaintiff to show reasonable or justifiable reliance when bringing 
a deceptive trade claim.  In Georgia the statute proscribing a 
deceptive trade claim, known as the Fair Business Practices Act 
(“FBPA”), does not on its face require a plaintiff to show 
reliance on the FBPA violation.91  The FBPA only requires that 
a consumer “suffers injury or damages as a result of a violation . 
. . .”92  However, Georgia courts have “incorporat[ed] the 
‘reliance’ element of the common law tort of misrepresentation” 
into the FBPA because the statute requires a plaintiff to provide 
notice to the defendant of the “unfair or deceptive act or practice 
relied upon . . . .”93 
87. Infra notes 91-137 and accompanying text.
88. Infra notes 91-137 and accompanying text.
89. See Tiisman v. Linda Martin Homes Corp., 637 S.E.2d 14 (Ga. 2006); Weinberg
v. Sun Comp., Inc., 777 A.2d 442 (Pa. 2001).  Unlike Georgia and Pennsylvania, Arizona
courts have judicially interpreted an element of reliance but the reliance does not have to be
reasonable.  But see Parks v. Macro-Dynamics, Inc., 591 P.2d 1005 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979);
Peery v. Hansen, 585 P.2d 574 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978).  This difference may be attributable
to the fact that Arizona’s consumer protection act does not provide for an individual right
of action and the private right of action has been interpreted by the courts.  See ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 44-1521 to 44-1534 (West 2018); Sellinger v. Freeway Mobile Home Sales,
Inc., 521 P.2d 1119, 1122 (Ariz. 1974).
90. Infra notes 110-137 and accompanying text.
91. GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-399 (West 2018) (creating private actions under Fair
Business Practices Act). 
92. GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-399 (West 2018) (creating private actions under Fair
Business Practices Act). 
93. Zeeman v. Black, 273 S.E.2d 910, 915 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980) (internal citations
omitted) (interpreting GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-399). 
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The Supreme Court of Georgia upheld incorporation of the 
reasonable reliance element from the tort of misrepresentation 
into the FBPA in Tiismann v. Linda Martin Homes Corp.94  In 
Tiismann, the defendant agreed to build a house for plaintiff, and 
the building contract contained a clause that defendant would 
complete construction in accordance with all building codes.95  
However, the contract also contained a clause limiting warranty 
based on code violations.96  Plaintiff brought suit alleging 
defendant had violated the Georgia FBPA because of the 
conflicting language in the contract limiting liability.97  Plaintiff 
acknowledged “he knew when he signed the contract that the 
clause disclaiming responsibility for building to code was 
legally invalid.”98  Because plaintiff knew the clause was 
unenforceable, the court found plaintiff could not have 
reasonably relied on the clause.99 
The Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer 
Protection Law (“UTPCPL”) does not contain the word 
reliance.100  But, similar to Georgia’s FBPA, the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court has found that reliance is an element of a 
UTPCPL claim.101  Plaintiffs must not simply show reliance—
the reliance must be justifiable.102  The Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court interpreted the statute as including a reliance requirement 
because the UTPCPL’s “underlying foundation is fraud 
prevention” and there was no evidence the legislature wanted to 
“do away with the traditional common law elements” of fraud, 
including reliance.103 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld this justifiable 
reliance requirement in Yocca v. Pittsburgh Steelers Sports, 
Inc.104  In Yocca, the plaintiffs brought a class action against the 
Pittsburg Steelers football team for violation of the UTPCPL 
94. Tiisman, 637 S.E.2d 14.
95. Id. at 16.
96. Id. 
97. Id. 
98. Id. at 18 (quotations and citation omitted) (emphasis added).
99. Tiismann, 637 S.E.2d at 16. 
100. See 73 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 201-9.2 (West 2018).
101. See 73 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 201-9.2 (West 2018); Weinberg,
777 A.2d 442.  
102. Yocca v. Pittsburg Steeler Sports, Inc., 854 A.2d 425 (Pa. 2004).
103. Weinberg, 777 A.2d at 446.
104. Yocca, 854 A.2d at 438-39.
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when the plaintiffs’ season tickets were in a different location 
than illustrated in a brochure.105  Defendants sent out brochures 
illustrating the new Pittsburg Steelers football stadium and 
diagramming seats that were available for season ticket 
purchase.106  The plaintiffs eventually signed a contract for the 
sale of the seats and the contract included an integration clause 
that “supersede[d] any representations or agreements previously 
made . . . .”107  Plaintiffs claimed the brochures were 
misrepresentations of the actual seats, and they relied on the 
misrepresentation in deciding to purchase the seats.108  Because 
the court found Plaintiffs were required to justifiably rely on the 
misrepresentation and the contract “disclaimed reliance” the 
Plaintiffs could not show justifiable reliance.109 
2. Reliance Through Statutory Amendments
The other way states require reliance in deceptive trade 
practice claims is through legislative amendments to the 
underlying statutes.  States such as Texas110, Vermont111, 
Wyoming112, and Indiana113 have specific statutory provisions 
that require plaintiff’s reliance on the deceptive or unfair trade 
practice.  Courts in such states have found plaintiffs must show 
reliance, but there is no discussion on the necessity of the 
reliance to be reasonable or justified.114 
For example, the Texas Deceptive Trade Practice and 
Consumer Protection Act (“DTPA”) provides consumers with a 
private right of action that requires consumers to show 
detrimental reliance as an element to the claim.115  Specifically, 
a consumer can bring a claim under the DTPA where “the use or 
employment by any person of a false, misleading or deceptive 
act or practice that is . . . specifically enumerated. . . and relied 
105. Id. at 427. 
106. Id. at 427-28. 
107. Id. at 431.
108. Id. 
109. Yocca, 854 A.2d at 438-39.
110. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50 (West 2018).
111. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2461 (West 2018).
112. See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40-12-108 (West 2018).
113. See IND. CODE ANN. § 24-5-0.5-4 (West 2018).
114. See infra 115-137 and accompanying text.
115. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(a)(1)(A)-(B) (West 2018).
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on by a consumer to the consumer’s detriment.”116  The Texas 
Supreme Court has upheld the reliance requirement and stated 
that “a consumer loses without proof that he relied to his 
detriment on the deceptive act.”117 
For example, in McLeod v. Gyr, the Texas Court of 
Appeals found that a plaintiff did not have to use the word 
“rely” or “reliance” in a DTPA claim in order to prove 
detrimental reliance.118  Alfred Gyr was a citizen of Switzerland 
residing in the United States, seeking American citizenship.119  
Gyr sought counsel of attorney Bruce McLeod to help with the 
naturalization process.120  McLeod told Gyr he “specialized in 
immigration matters . . . including the . . . application to become 
naturalized United States citizens . . . .”121  Upon McLeod’s 
assertions that he represented people in becoming naturalized, 
Gyr retained McLeod to handle the naturalization process.122  
Despite McLeod’s claims to be experienced in immigration 
matters, Gyr’s naturalization application was filed and denied 
four times.123  Eventually Gyr sought the help of another 
attorney and became naturalized “within three months of filing 
the application.”124  Gyr sued McLeod for deceptive trade 
practice.125  At trial, Gyr succeeded on his claims under the 
DTPA.126  McLeod appealed claiming Gyr failed to “testify that 
he relied upon any alleged misrepresentation.”127  Because Gyr 
testified that he told McLeod he was seeking naturalization and 
McLeod said he “specialized in immigration” the court found 
Gyr retained McLeod based on this representation.128  
According to the court a “reasonable inference” existed that Gyr 
116. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(a)(1)(A)-(B) (West 2018)
(emphasis added). 
117. Cruz v. Andrews Restoration, Inc., 364 S.W.3d 817, 823 (Tex. 2012) (finding
plaintiff could not succeed on DTPA claim when a finding of reliance is not present). 
118. McLeod v. Gyr, 439 S.W.3d 639, 648 (Tex. Ct. App. 2014) (quotations and
citations omitted). 
119. Id. at 643.
120. Id. 
121. Id. 
122. Id. at 643-44.
123. McLeod, 439 S.W.3d at 644.
124. Id. at 644.
125. Id. 
126. Id. at 645.
127. Id. at 648.
128. McLeod, 439 S.W.3d at 648.
2019 DECEPTIVELY SIMPLE 1045 
hired McLeod because of the belief in McLeod’s “expertise in 
handling immigration matters . . . .”129  Although Gyr did not 
testify that he had relied on McLeod’s representation, the court 
found Gyr satisfied the element of detrimental reliance because 
it was clear McLeod’s services were retained based on his claim 
to be an expert in immigration.130 
Vermont’s deceptive trade practices act also requires a 
plaintiff to show reliance.131  Vermont Statute title 9, § 2461 
allows a consumer who “contracts for goods and services in 
reliance upon false or fraudulent representations or practices 
prohibited” to bring a claim.132  The Vermont Supreme Court 
has upheld the reliance requirement in the deceptive trade 
practices statute, but did not discuss how a reasonable consumer 
must prove their reliance.133  In Russel, the court found plaintiffs 
could not show reliance on defendant’s threat of eviction 
because plaintiffs had sought, and were awarded, declaratory 
relief from the threat of eviction.134  Although the court in 
Russel required the plaintiffs to show there was reliance on the 
deceptive trade violation, the court did not explicitly state that 
the reliance had to be reasonable.135 
Arkansas plaintiffs hoping to bring a claim under the 
ADTPA will have to show reliance on the deceptive trade 
violation,136 but it is unlikely that the reliance will be the same 
as is required in the common law fraud claims.  Guidance from 
Texas and Vermont, states with similar deceptive trade statutes, 
demonstrates statutory reliance need not be reasonable or 
justified.137  However, if Arkansas courts do make the 
connection between ADTPA claims and fraud, plaintiffs may 
have to show the reliance was justified or reasonable and the 
pathway to a successful ADTPA claim will be that much more 
difficult. 
129. Id..
130. Id. at 648-49. 
131. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2461 (West 2018).
132. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2461(b) (West 2018) (emphasis added).
133. See Russel v. Atkins, 679 A.2d 333, 335-36 (Vt. 1996).
134. See id.
135. See id.
136. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-88-113(f)(2) (2017)
137. See discussion supra Part II(A)(2).
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B. ACTUAL FINANCIAL LOSS
The second change to the ADTPA is the requirement that 
the plaintiff suffered an “actual financial loss.”138  Actual 
financial loss is defined as “an ascertainable amount of money 
that is equal to the difference between the amount paid by a 
person for goods or services and the actual market value of the 
goods or services provided to a person.”139  This new language 
eliminates the actual damage measure that was previously in the 
ADTPA.140  This addition to the ADTPA appears to be a 
codification of the Arkansas “out-of-pocket” measure of 
damages.  There are two main measures of damages in 
Arkansas, “out-of-pocket” and “benefit-of-the-bargain.141  
Benefit-of-the-bargain is measured by the difference in the 
product as represented and the actual value.142  The Arkansas 
Supreme Court has defined the out-of-pocket measure as the 
“difference between the purchase price and the actual value of 
the goods received.”143  The court has “indicated an apparent 
preference for the benefit-of-the-bargain approach.”144  Benefit-
of-the-bargain gives the purchaser his expectation which “may 
achieve more complete justice.”145 
Nationwide, benefit-of-the-burden is the measure of 
damages generally applied.146  With the new actual financial loss 
requirement, Arkansas joins a minority of jurisdictions that 
measure deceptive trade damages under the out-of-pocket test.147  
138. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-88-113(f) (2017).
139. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-88-102(9) (2017).
140. 1990 Ark. Acts 3662.
141. Interstate Freeway Servs., Inc. v. Houser, 310 Ark. 302, 309, 835 S.W.2d 872, 
875 (1992). 
142. Dixon Ticonderoga Co. v. Winburn Title Mfg. Co., 324 Ark. 266, 920 S.W.2d 
829 (1996). 
143. Interstate Freeway Services, Inc., 310 Ark. at 309, 835 S.W.2d at 875.  For
further explanation of the out-of-pocket measure, see HOWARD W. BRILL & CHRISTIAN H. 
BRILL, ARKANSAS LAW OF DAMAGES § 33.8 (2018); JOHN WESLEY HALL, JR, TRIAL 
HANDBOOK FOR ARKANSAS LAWYERS § 88.19 (2017-2018 ed.). 
144. BRILL & BRILL, supra note 143, at § 33.8. 
145. Id. 
146. See, e.g., PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 4, at § 6.4; Gastaldi v. Sunvest
Resort Communities LC, 709 F. Supp. 2d 1299 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (applying Florida law); 
Follo v. Florindo, 185 Vt. 390 (Vt. 2009).  
147. PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 4, at § 6.4. 
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Of those states that allow for the out-of-pocket measure, 
consumers are typically allowed to choose between the two.148 
For example, under the Texas DTPA, a consumer can 
recover damages in either the benefit-of-the-bargain or out-of-
pocket measures, whichever is greater.149  In Blackstock v. 
Dudley, the Texas Court of Appeals found that a consumer 
could recover under either measure of damages, but not both.150  
Plaintiffs brought suit for violation of DTPA after defendants 
did not disclose serious plumbing problems in the course of 
selling a house to plaintiffs.151  After the house was purchased 
for $90,000, plaintiffs had “numerous floods” and made 
repairs.152  Plaintiffs were awarded the “difference between the 
value of the home at the time of sale and the price paid for it” 
and the “reasonable and necessary” out-of-pocket expenses.153  
Defendants appealed on the basis that plaintiffs could not 
receive double recovery.154  The court found that although 
plaintiffs were entitled to choose between benefit-of-the-bargain 
and out-of-pocket expenses, plaintiffs could not also recover the 
repair expenses.155 
With the new requirement of actual financial loss in 
Arkansas, consumers will only be able to recover damages if the 
purchase price was different than the market value of the 
product purchased.156 
C. CLASS ACTION PROHIBITION
The third change to the ADTPA is the elimination of the 
right to a private class action.157  Now, the only class actions that 
may be brought under the ADTPA are those brought by the 
Attorney General or class actions maintained for violation of the 
usury rates under Amendment 89 of the Arkansas 
148. See id.
149. W.O. Bankston Nissan, Inc. v. Walters, 754 S.W.2d 127, 128 (Tex. 1988).
150. Blackstock v. Dudley, 12 S.W.3d 131, 135 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999).




155. Blackstock, 12 S.W.3d at 135. 
156. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-88-102(9) (2017).
157. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-88-113(f)(1)(B) (2017).
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Constitution.158  Many states, unlike Arkansas, allow private 
parties to bring class actions under deceptive trade practices 
acts.159  Some states, such as Massachusetts, even loosen the 
typical class action requirements to make it easier for plaintiffs 
to bring class actions.160  The underlying justification of these 
reduced class action requirements is a policy choice to protect 
consumers.161  Despite this policy concern, Arkansas joins a 
growing handful of states that restrict class actions in deceptive 
trade practice violations.162 
For example, Georgia163, Montana164, Mississippi165, and 
South Carolina166 have outright bans on class actions in their 
respective deceptive trade practices acts.167  In these states a 
private class action cannot be maintained for violation of the 
deceptive trade practices act.168  State courts have upheld these 
outright restrictions.169  In Dema v. Tenent Physician Services-
Hiton Head, Inc., the Supreme Court of South Carolina upheld a 
motion to dismiss because plaintiffs brought a class action and 
the South Carolina deceptive trade practice act did not allow 
plaintiffs to bring a class action.170  In its analysis, the court 
pointed to other states such as Georgia and Louisiana who have 
upheld the outright ban on class action lawsuits.171 
158. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-88-113(f)(1)(B) (2017).
159. PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 4, at § 6:29 
160. Id. 
161. See id.
162. See id. (explaining very few states restrict class actions).
163. GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-399(a) (West 2018) (prohibiting private right of action
in representative capacity). 
164. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-13-133(1) (West 2018) (prohibiting consumer from
bringing class action). 
165. MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-24-15(4) (West 2018) (prohibiting class actions,
although Mississippi does not permit class action in any context, see JAMES W. SHELSON, 
MISSISSIPPI CHANCERY PRACTICE § 4:19 (2018 ed.)). 
166. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-140(a) (West 2018).
167. See GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-399(a) (West 2018); MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-24-
15(4) (West 2018); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-13-133(1) (West 2018); S.C. CODE ANN. § 
39-5-140(a) (West 2018). 
168. See GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-399(a) (West 2018); MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-24-
15(4) (West 2018); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-13-133(1) (West 2018); S.C. CODE ANN. § 
39-5-140(a) (West 2018). 
169. See, e.g., Dema v. Tenent Physician Services-Hilton Head, Inc., 678 S.E.2d 
430, 434 (S.C. 2009); Walker v. Sunrise Pontiac-GMC Truck, Inc., 249 S.W.3d 301, 311 
(Tenn. 2018). 
170. See Dema, 678 S.E.2d at 434.
171. See id.
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Connecticut and New Hampshire provide a less restrictive 
approach to limiting class actions in deceptive trade practice 
statutes.172  In these states, the statutes allow private parties to 
bring a class action suit so long as certain residency 
requirements are met.173  In Connecticut, a class action may be 
maintained only if the plaintiffs are residents of Connecticut or 
if the plaintiffs were injured in Connecticut.174  This residency 
requirement has the effect of limiting the class action 
mechanism without completely eliminating the option for 
plaintiffs to bring class actions. 
Utah restricts the use of class actions restriction in its 
consumer protection statute based on the type of violation.175  
Consumers may only bring a class action in three circumstances 
under the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act.176  The violation 
must either be, (1) a violation that is prohibited in the statute; (2) 
an act ruled to be a violation by a final judgement of a court or; 
(3) an act prohibited by the terms of a consent judgment which
is final.177
Alabama’s class action restriction is most similar to the 
restriction found in the ADTPA.178  The Alabama Deceptive 
Trade Practices Act (“ALDTPA”) provides that a “consumer or 
other person bringing an action under this chapter may not bring 
an action on behalf of a class.”179  Similar to Arkansas, the 
Alabama Attorney General may bring a class action under the 
deceptive trade practices act.180  However, Alabama provides no 
exception for usury violations.181 
Consumer protection class actions make up around one-
third of the class actions brought against business defendants.182  
Due to the high number of consumer class actions, some 
172. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-110g(b) (West 2018); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 358-A:10-A(I) (West 2018).
173. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-110g(b) (West 2018); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 358-A:10-A(I) (West 2018).
174. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-110g(b) (West 2018).
175. UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-11-19 (West 2018).
176. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-11-19(4)(a) (West 2018).
177. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-11-19(4)(a) (West 2018).
178. ALA. CODE § 8-9-10(f) (West 2018).
179. See ALA. CODE § 8-9-10(f) (West 2018).
180. See ALA. CODE § 8-9-10(g) (West 2018).
181. See generally ALA. CODE § 8-9-10 (West 2018).
182. See Scheuerman, supra note 83, at 3-4.
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commentators have suggested placing restrictions on a 
plaintiff’s ability to bring a class action in both federal and state 
court.183  Although Arkansas is not alone in placing restrictions 
on the availability of class actions, the outright ban of private 
class actions makes Arkansas one of the most restrictive states.  
While consumers may fear business will be left unaccountable 
for deceptive trade violations, there is a modicum of protection 
in the Attorney General’s authority to bring class actions under 
the new ADTPA.184 
III. PROSPECTIVE LOOK AT THE ADTPA CLASS
ACTIONS RESTRICTIONS 
A. POSSIBILITY OF A ADTPA IN FEDERAL
COURT THROUGH DIVERSITY JURISDICTION
Because class actions are now prohibited under the 
ADTPA,185 plaintiffs will likely seek to maintain class actions in 
federal court through diversity jurisdiction.  Class actions in 
federal court are controlled by Rule of Federal Procedure 23 
(“Rule 23”), which provides a class action “may be maintained” 
if certain conditions are met.186  Unlike the ADTPA, Rule 23 
does not prohibit a class action for a deceptive trade practice 
violation.187  This conflict poses an interesting dilemma for 
federal courts presented with the issue of certifying an ADTPA 
class action—should the court apply Rule 23 to certify the class 
or apply Ark. Code Ann. § 4-88-113(f)(2)(B) which would 
prohibit the class action?  This issue leads into the murky waters 
the Supreme Court established in Shady Grove Orthopedic 
Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co.188 and the difficulty 
183. See generally Stacey M. Lantagne, A Matter of National Importance: The
Persistent Inefficiency of Deceptive Advertising Class Actions, J. BUS. & TECH. L. 117 
(2013) 
184. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-88-113(a) (2017).
185. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-88-113(f)(1)(B) (2017).
186. FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
187. Compare FED. R. CIV. O. 23, with ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-88-113(f)(1)(B)
(2017). 
188. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 410 
(2010). 
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lower federal courts have had in interpreting the plurality 
opinion issued by the Court.189 
Before 2010, a federal court hearing a claim in diversity 
based on a state law action when faced with the issue of 
applying state or federal law had a fairly simple test to run 
through.  If there was a federal rule of procedure that conflicted 
with a state rule of procedure the court would follow a two-step 
test.190  First, the court would determine if the federal rule and 
the state rule really clashed or if the two could operate 
together.191  If the two rules could operate together the analysis 
ended and both rules applied.192  However, if the two could not 
be reconciled, the second step was to determine if the federal 
rule violated the Rules Enabling Act.193  The Rules Enabling Act 
provided the Supreme Court with the power to create rules of 
practice and procedure as long as they do not modify, abridge or 
enlarge a state substantive right.194  The Supreme Court 
interpreted the Rules Enabling Act to mean a federal rule was 
valid as long as it really regulated procedure.195  Under this test, 
no federal rule had ever been deemed to violate the Rules 
Enabling Act by the Supreme Court.196  This two-step approach 
provided general guidance for courts in determining whether to 
apply federal rules or state rules in federal court, and under this 
original framework it is likely Rule 23 would control instead of 
the class action prohibition in the ADTPA. 
However this framework was altered in 2010 when the 
Supreme Court issued its opinion in Shady Grove.197  In Shady 
Grove, the Court considered whether a New York class action 
prohibition trumped Rule 23 when certifying a class action in 
federal court.198  The New York statute in question prohibited 
class actions for those plaintiffs seeking penalties or statutory 
189. See infra notes 220-44 and accompanying text.
190. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 462-65 (1965) (finding a conflict between
service of process rules and determining if the federal rule really regulated procedure). 
191. Id. 
192. Id. 
193. Id. at 464.
194. Id. 
195. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 464; Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., Inc., 312 U.S. 1, 14 
(1941). 
196. See Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 407.
197. See id.
198. See id. at 397.
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minimum damages.199  While a majority of justices agreed that 
Rule 23 was controlling, no majority was reached on the test to 
determine which rule applied in federal court.200 
Justice Scalia, in his plurality opinion, and Justice Stevens, 
in his concurrence, both agreed the first step in the analysis was 
to determine if Rule 23 and the New York statute conflicted.201  
Because both Rule 23 and the New York statute provided an 
answer to the question of class certification, five justices agreed 
there was a conflict between the two rules.202  Due to this 
conflict, the next step in the analysis was to examine Rule 23 to 
see if it violated the Rules Enabling Act.203  However, Justices 
Scalia and Stevens disagreed on how to determine if Rule 23 
was authorized under the Rules Enabling Act.204 
Under the plurality approach, opined the determination of a 
violation of the Rules Enabling Act was based on if the rule 
“really regulate[d] procedure.”205  In other words, if the rule 
“governs only ‘the manner and the means’ by which the 
litigants’ rights are ‘enforced,’ it is valid; if it alters ‘the rules of 
decisions by which [the] court will adjudicate [those] rights,’ it 
is not.’”206  Because Rule 23 only altered how claims are 
processed, Justice Scalia found Rule 23 “really regulate[d] 
procedure” and, therefore, was valid under the Rules Enabling 
Act.207  Under Justice Scalia’s analysis, Rule 23 was controlling 
for the federal court class action certification.208 
199. See id. at 396.
200. See id. at 395-96. Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Stevens, Thomas,
Sotomayor and Chief Justice Roberts joined Justice Scalia’s opinion in Parts I and II-A. 
See Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 395-96. Part II-A found Rule 23 conflicted with NY statute. 
See id. at 398-406.  Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas and Sotomayor joined 
Justice Scalia in Parts II-B (finding it is the federal rule’s procedural nature that is 
significant) and II-D (explaining forum shopping may be inevitable). See id at 406-16.  Part 
II-C, an answer to the concurrence finding conflict with Sibbach, was joined by Justices 
Scalia and Thomas and Chief Justice Roberts. See id. at 410-15. Justice Stevens concurred 
in part and concurred with the judgment. See id. at 410-11. Justice Ginsburg’s dissent was 
joined by Justices Kennedy, Breyer, and Alito. See Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 436. 
201. Id. at 398, 421.
202. Id. at 397-407. 
203. Id. at 406-10. 
204. Id. at 424.
205. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 410 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
206. Id. at 407 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
207. Id. at 408-10. According to Justice Scalia, the court looks to the federal rule to
see if the federal rule really regulated procedure; there is no need to look at the state law. 
208. Id.at 408.
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In his concurrence, Justice Stevens declared that the second 
step in determining if the rule violated the Rules Enabling Act 
was to see if the federal rule displaced a state law that was “so 
intertwined with a state right or remedy that it functions to 
define the scope of the state-created right.”209  According to 
Justice Stevens, because the bar for finding an Enabling Rules 
Act conflict is high, “in order to displace a federal rule, there 
must be more than just a possibility” the state law is 
substantive.210  Because the New York law was procedural and 
did not define any rights, Justice Stevens found Rule 23 did not 
violate the Rules Enabling Act and Rule 23 was controlling in 
the case.211  Although the court did not reach a majority on why 
Rule 23 did not violate the Rules Enabling Act, the majority in 
the case found Rule 23 to be controlling in determining if a class 
action could be brought in federal court.212 
Justice Ginsburg, joined by three other justices, dissented 
because of the belief that there was not a direct conflict between 
the New York class action statute and Rule 23.213  According to 
Justice Ginsburg, the court should interpret Federal Rules with 
sensitivity to important state interests.214  The purpose of the 
New York statute was to “prevent the exorbitant inflation of 
penalties.”215  Because of this, Justice Ginsburg argued there 
was no direct conflict with Rule 23 as Rule 23 only proscribed 
the considerations relevant to class certification but not the 
remedy for class actions as the New York statute did.216  The 
dissent argued it was clear Rule 23 governed procedure because 
it still left open a state’s ability to control class action 
remedies.217  Ginsburg found the New York law to be 
substantive and therefore disagreed with decision to find Rule 
23 controlling.218  The dissent also pointed to Congress’ decision 
to limit class actions through the Class Action Fairness Act of 
209. Id. at 423.
210. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 436.
211. Id. 
212. Id. 
213. Id. at 446.
214. Id. at 437, 442.
215. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 445.
216. Id. at 447.
217. Id. at 447-48. 
218. Id. at 458.
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2005 as a way to illustrate the additional wrongs of the Court’s 
decision.219 
After the divided opinions in Shady Grove, many courts 
have struggled with how to determine if state law or federal law 
should apply in diversity jurisdiction actions.220  Some courts 
have applied Justice Stevens’ approach, while other courts look 
to Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion.221  When courts have 
applied Justice Scalia’s approach the federal rules tend to trump 
state law.222  In contrast, courts that have applied Justice 
Stevens’ test tends to find the state law applies.223  Although 
most courts have used Justice Stevens’ approach224, courts have 
yet to reach a consensus on which test to follow.  Therefore, it is 
unclear which approach is controlling in federal court, and it is 
likely the Supreme Court will have to take up this issue again.225 
Some federal district courts have examined whether a state 
class action restriction in a state consumer protection law was 
controlling in federal court.226  Relying on Justice Stevens’ 
approach, these courts found that when a class action restriction 
was placed in a consumer protection statute the restriction was 
substantive and, therefore, controlling over Rule 23.227  
However, if a restriction was in the state’s civil procedure rules, 
Rule 23 would be controlling over class certification.228  By 
using Justice Stevens’ approach, these district courts determined 
the location of the class action prohibition to be the deciding 
factor in finding a restriction to be substantive or procedural.229 
The only circuit court to examine a class action restriction 
in a state deceptive trade practice statute is the Eleventh Circuit 
219. Id. at 458-59. 
220. See Jack E. Pace III & Rachel J. Feldman, Looking for Sunlight in Shady
Grove: The Fate of State Law in Federal Diversity Cases Remains Unclear, 30 ANTITRUST 
86 (2016). 
221. Id. 
222. Id. at 87.
223. Id. 
224. Id. 
225. 19 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET. AL, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 4509
(3d ed. 2016). 
226. See Pace & Feldman, supra note 220, at 86.
227. See Leonard v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 2012 WL 764199 (E.D.N.Y. 2012); In re
Dig. Music Antitrust Litig., 812 F. Supp. 2d 390 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
228. See id.
229. See id.
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in Lisk v. Lumber One Wood Preserving, LLC.230  In Lisk, 
plaintiffs brought a class action for violation of the ALDTPA in 
federal district court.231  On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit 
reversed the district court’s finding that the class action 
restriction in Alabama’s deceptive trade statute applied instead 
of Rule 23.232  The Eleventh Circuit found the plain terms of the 
Rules Enabling Act showed a federal rule would apply as long 
as the rule did not “abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive 
right.”233  The Eleventh Circuit compared the case to Shady 
Grove and found the Alabama statute was a “stronger case” for 
applying Rule 23 because, unlike the New York statute which 
prohibited all class actions, the Alabama statute allowed class 
actions but only prohibited who could bring the class.234  
According to the Eleventh Circuit, if Rule 23 did not “abridge, 
enlarge or modify any substantive right” under the statute 
prohibiting all class actions, it could not “abridge, enlarge or 
modify any substantive right” when a statute only prohibited 
some class actions.235  The court ultimately found the fact that 
the Alabama class action restriction is a “statutorily created 
penalty” to be immaterial to the analysis.236 
The Eleventh Circuit also determined Rule 23 to be 
controlling because the Alabama class action restriction was not 
substantive.237  Because the class action restriction only 
determined if a plaintiff must bring individual actions or if a 
plaintiff could bring a representative action it was not about the 
substantive right plaintiffs had to bring an action under the 
deceptive trade practices act.238  Unlike other courts, the 
230. Lisk v. Lumber One Wood Preserving, LLC., 792 F.3d 1331 (11th Cir. 2015).
231. See id. at 1333.
232. See id.
233. See id. at 1335 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2072).
234. See id. at 1335-36. 
235. See Lisk, 792 F.3d at 1335-36.  After the decision in Lisk, the Alabama
Legislature changed the deceptive trade practice statute to include language that the class 
action prohibition was a substantive limitation. Most likely this was in order to avoid 
further issues like in Lisk. See Gregory C. Cook & Steven C. Corhern, The Alabama 
Legislature Solves Problem Created by the Eleventh Circuit, SE. FIN. LITIG. MONITOR 
(May 18, 2016), https://www.sefinanciallitigation.com/2016/05/the-alabama-legislature-
solves-problem-created-by-the-eleventh-circuit/ [https://perma.cc/6FLC-BR5X]. 
236. See Lisk, 792 F.3d at 1335.
237. Id. at 1336.
238. Id. at 1337-38. 
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Eleventh Circuit in Lisk, did not choose to follow Justice 
Stevens’s or Justice Scalia’s interpretation in Shady Grove.239  
Instead, the court pointed to the idea that the Court had reached 
a majority in Shady Grove and the holding was that Rule 23 
controlled.240 
The Eleventh Circuit’s interpretation of Shady Grove seems 
to provide plaintiffs an avenue to bring class actions in federal 
court even when a state statute prohibits such class actions.  
While some district courts have followed the Eleventh Circuit’s 
rationale241 others have rejected it on the grounds that the 
location of the class action restriction in a statutory scheme 
should determine if a prohibition was substantive.242  What this 
means for plaintiffs hoping to bring a class action under the 
ADTPA in federal court is uncertain.  The Eighth Circuit has yet 
to interpret Shady Grove,243 it is unclear how they would rule on 
a class action prohibition in federal court.  Although a recent 
case in the Eastern District of Arkansas found the class action 
prohibition to be procedural, the analysis was performed while 
determining retroactivity of the statute, so the finding may not 
apply in a Shady Grove context.244 
It will be interesting to see how federal district courts in 
Arkansas and the Eighth Circuit, will rule on this issue.  Will 
they follow the Eleventh Circuit and the district courts who have 
ruled that similar prohibitions are state substantive law?  Or will 
the courts find the prohibition to be procedural, preventing 
plaintiffs from pursuing a class action in federal court?  If, the 
courts find the prohibition to be substantive, the ADTPA will do 
exactly what its proponents envisioned—eliminate a consumer’s 
ability to bring a private class action under the statute. 
239. Id. at 1336.
240. Id. at 1335.
241. Suchanek v. Sturm Foods, Inc., 311 F.R.D 239, 263-64 (S.D. Ill. 2015) (finding
Lisk’s analysis to be determinative in finding Rule 23 controlled instead of class action 
restrictions located in state deceptive trade practice statutes).  
242. See Fejzulai v. Sam’s West, Inc., 205 F. Supp. 3d 723, 728-29 (D. S.C. 2016).
243. See Davenport v. Charter Commc’ns., LLC, 35 F. Supp. 3d 1040, 1050 (E.D. 
Mo. 2014). 
244. Mounce v. CHSPSC, No. 5:15-CV-05197, 2017 WL 4392048, at *6-7 (W.D. 
Ark. Sept. 29, 2017) (but this was in a different context, determining if the statute 
retroactively applied). 
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B. ARKANSAS CONSTITUTIONAL
AMENDMENT 80 
Plaintiffs may also seek to challenge the prohibition on 
class action under Arkansas Constitution Amendment 80.245  In 
2000, Arkansas voters gave exclusive authority to the Arkansas 
Supreme Court to create “rules of pleading, practice and 
procedure for all courts.”246  Due to this amendment, the 
Arkansas General Assembly is prohibited from making 
procedural rules, however, the General Assembly may create or 
modify substantive rules and rights.247  Thus, when a statute 
promulgated by the legislature is procedural and “bypasses [the] 
rules of pleading, practice and procedure,” it is a violation of the 
separation-of-powers doctrine.248 
The court defines procedural law as “the rules that 
proscribe the steps for having a right or duty, judicially 
enforced . . . .”249  Law is substantive when it “creates, defines, 
and regulates the rights, duties, and powers of parties.”250  The 
Arkansas Supreme Court has found statutes to be substantive 
when the provision creates a privilege, such as an opportunity to 
refuse to testify.251  A statute is also substantive when the 
provision creates or modifies the plaintiff’s burden of proof. 
Statutes are procedural when the legislature attempts to establish 
its own procedure or create a rule of evidence.252  For example, 
when a statute defines how an action is commenced, the statute 
is procedural in nature.253  If a rule of pleading, practice or 
procedure already exists and the statute adds requirements or 
changes the rule, it is likely to be a violation of the separation-
245. See ARK. CONST. of 1874, amend. 80, § 3 (2018).
246. See id.; DAVID NEWBERN ET AL., ARKANSAS CIVIL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE §
1:3 (5th. ed. 2017). 
247. See Cato v. Craighead Cty. Cir. Ct., 2009 Ark 334, at 7-8, 322 S.W.3d 484, 
487-89. 
248. See id. at 8-9, 322 S.W.3d at 489 (citing Johnson v Rockwell Automation, Inc.,
2009 Ark. 241, at 7-10, 308 S.W.3d 135, 140-41). 
249. See Johnson v Rockwell Automation, Inc., 2009 Ark. 241, at 8, 308 S.W.3d 
135, 141 (citations and quotations omitted).  
250. See id. (citations omitted).
251. See Bedell v. Williams, 2012 Ark. 75, at 17, 386 S.W.3d 493, 504-05. 
252. See Johnson, 2009 Ark. at 7-10, 308 S.W.3d at 140-41. 
253. See Summerville v. Thrower, 369 Ark. 231, 253 S.W.3d 415 (2007).
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of-powers doctrine.254  However, the statute does not need to be 
in conflict with a rule of procedure in order to violate the 
separation-of-powers doctrine.255 
The class action prohibition in the ADTPA is in direct 
conflict with Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 23, which 
provides that a class action may be maintained if certain 
prerequisites are satisfied.256  Because this statutory provision 
creates a rule on when class actions may be brought, in conflict 
with Rule 23, it is likely the law will be considered procedural.  
In Broussard, where the court found a statute to be procedural 
when the statute created additional requirements for expert 
witness framework already established in Arkansas Rule of 
Evidence 702.257 
Currently, the Arkansas Supreme Court has the power to 
make the procedural rules under Amendment 80.258  However, 
there has been an attempt by the General Assembly to change 
the exclusive rulemaking authority.259  This change was 
attempted by a constitutional amendment, Senate Joint 
Resolution 8, which was slated to be on the November 2018 
ballot as “Issue 1.”260  Issue 1 amendment had four sections.261  
Part one was a thirty-three and one-half percent limitation on 
attorney contingency fees.262  Part two placed a $500,000 limit 
on a plaintiff’s ability to recover non-economic damages, a limit 
on punitive damages, and gave the General Assembly power to 
254. See Broussard v. St. Edward Mercy Health System, Inc., 2012 Ark. 14, 386 
S.W.3d 385 (finding violation of separation-of-powers when the statute added a 
requirement to a rule of evidence already in existence).  
255. See Johnson, 2009 Ark. at 8, 308 S.W.3d at 141.
256. ARK. R. CIV. P. 23(b). (requiring a class to prove numerosity, commonality,
typicality, adequacy, predominance, and superiority). 
257. See Broussard, 2012 Ark. at 7-8, 386 S.W.3d at 389-90. 
258. Id. at 5-6, 386 S.W.3d at 389.
259. John Moritz, Plans Set by Group to Oppose Ballot Bid, ARK. DEMOCRAT-
GAZETTE, (Mar. 9, 2018, 1:01 AM), 
http://www.arkansasonline.com/news/2018/mar/09/plans-set-by-group-to-oppose-ballot-
bid/ [https://perma.cc/97VM-HM6G].  
260. Aric Mitchell, Issue 1 Supporters Look to the Arkansas Supreme Court for
Decision by ‘Mid-October’, TALK BUS. & POL. (Sept. 7, 2018, 12:29 PM) 
https://talkbusiness.net/2018/09/issue-1-supporters-look-to-the-arkansas-supreme-court-
for-decision-by-mid-october/ [https://perma.cc/D23S-QEM6].  
261. S.J. Res. 8, 91st Gen Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2017).
262. See id.
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enact addition rules regarding part two.263  Part three changed 
Amendment 80, giving the General Assembly the power to 
adopt, amend, and repeal the rules of pleading, practice and 
procedure for the Arkansas Judiciary.264  Lastly, part four made 
additional changes to Amendment 80 which amend the Supreme 
Court’s determination of jurisdiction.265 
Although Issue 1 was to be on the ballot, the Arkansas 
Supreme Court upheld a declaratory judgment to effectively 
remove Issue 1 from the ballot because Issue 1 violated Article 
19, section 22 of the Arkansas Constitution.266  Article 19, 
section 22 provides that the General Assembly may submit up to 
three amendments to the voters.267  The three amendments 
allowed must be separate and the court has found amendments 
are separate if all parts of the amendments are “reasonably 
germane to each other and to the general subject of the 
amendment.”268  Germane has been interpreted to mean 
“‘relevant; pertinent’ or ‘having a close relationship.’”269 
The court found that the four parts of issue one are not 
germane to each other because part one limits legal services 
contracts of private parties while parts three and four “broaden 
and diversify the legislature’s ability to exert influence over 
judicial rule-making authority.”270  Neither part one or parts 
three and four of Issue 1 “support, develop, clarify, or otherwise 
aid the function of [the other sections] in any meaningful 
way.”271  The court also found there was no “general subject” to 
which the parts were reasonably germane because part one dealt 
with private agreements between attorney and client while the 
other sections involved the courts and the judiciary or judicial 




266. See generally Martin v. Humphrey, 2018 Ark. 295; John Moritz, Arkansas
Supreme Court Yanks Issue 1, Calls it Overly Broad, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE (Oct. 19, 
2018, 4:30 AM), https://www.arkansasonline.com/news/2018/oct/19/justices-yank-issue-1-
call-it-overly-br/ [https://perma.cc/5MLW-7ML3]. 
267. Martin, 2018 Ark. 295, at 7-8. 
268. See id. at 8. (emphasis, citation, and quotations omitted).
269. See id. (citation and quotations omitted).
270. See id. at 9.
271. See id.
272. Martin, 2018 Ark. 295, at 9-10. 
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to each other the court upheld a declaratory judgment preventing 
the Arkansas Secretary of State from counting, canvassing, or 
certifying votes for or against Issue 1.273 
By taking Issue 1 off the ballot, the Supreme Court has 
ensured plaintiffs hoping to challenge the class action 
prohibition in the ADTPA as unconstitutional under 
Amendment 80.  Despite the elimination of Issue 1, there could 
always be proposed amendments in the future dealing with the 
exclusive rule making authority of the Arkansas Supreme Court. 
CONCLUSION 
The changes to the ADTPA will likely cause a decrease in 
the number of cases brought under the ADTPA.274  Because of 
the additional requirements of reliance and actual financial loss, 
consumers will find it more difficult to succeed on a claim.275  
The class action prohibition will also eliminate the ability of a 
group of consumers, all with damages too small to support an 
individual cause of action, to bring a cause of action against a 
business for multiple violations.276  A class action by the 
Attorney General is now the best avenue for consumers hoping 
to recover.277  ADTPA defendants will need to be cognizant of 
the possibility of a constitutional challenge to these changes in 
state court, as well as the likelihood of an attempt to bring a 
class action in federal court under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure.278  As the landscape of consumer protection 
in Arkansas shifts into a more business-friendly environment, it 
will be intriguing to see how consumers will adjust their 
litigation strategies to bring claims based on the Arkansas 
Deceptive Trade Practices Act. 
MARGARET E. RUSHING 
273. See id. at 14.
274. See supra Part I.D.
275. See supra Part II.A, Part II.B.
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